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Abstract
Privacy and nondiscrimination are related but different. We make
this observation precise in two ways. First, we show that both privacy
and nondiscrimination have two versions, a causal version and a stati-
cal associative version, with each version corresponding to a competing
view of the proper goal of privacy or nondiscrimination. Second, for each
version, we show that a difference between the privacy edition of the ver-
sion and the nondiscrimination edition of the version is related to the
difference between Bayesian probabilities and frequentist probabilities. In
particular, privacy admits both Bayesian and frequentist interpretations
whereas nondiscrimination is limited to the frequentist interpretation. We
show how the introduced correspondence allows results from one area of
research to be used for the other.
1 Introduction
Privacy and nondiscrimination appear both related and yet different. The two
are both norms that help to ensure that powerful entities treat people fairly by
not violating social values. However, privacy is typically seen as protecting in-
formation from disclosure while nondiscrimination is seen as prohibiting certain
behaviors based upon known information about protected attributes, such as
gender or race.
In this paper, we explore the relationship between privacy and nondiscrimi-
nation from a technical angle. We demonstrate that key aspects of privacy and
nondiscrimination mirror each other at a formal level, and make a case for the
exchange of techniques between the communities independently studying the
two. Further, for each norm, there exist two stances within the research com-
munity studying it: whether the norm, privacy or nondiscrimination, should
be measured in terms of association (probabilistic dependence) or in terms of
causation. We express, in terms of probability theory, the two stances for each
of the two norms. Doing so makes precise the exact difference between each pair
of stances, revealing that each pair differs over the same issue.
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In more detail, for privacy, the competing stances lead to what we will call
associative privacy and causal privacy. Associative privacy properties typically
show up in works attempting to minimize the knowledge gained by an adversary
upon observing the outcomes of a computation, that is, works attempting to
provide statistical nondisclosure (e.g., [1]). Causal privacy instead focuses on
whether some particular action leads to a large change, with differential privacy
being the prime example (e.g., [2–8]). Tschantz et al. has already noted the
causal nature of differential privacy [9].
As for nondiscrimination, two stances predominate in U.S. law, disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment, with similar counterparts in the rest of the world.
These are complex legal tests involving concepts that are difficult to apply to
algorithms, such as intent, and numerous caveats and exceptions. However,
at their cores are two standards, which we will call associative nondiscrimi-
nation and causal nondiscrimination. Associative nondiscrimination demands
that members of protected classes should not disproportionately suffer adverse
actions. Roughly speaking, to avoid a finding of associative discrimination, or
disparate impact, a governed entity (e.g., a large employer) must ensure that
the proportion of members of a protected class (e.g., women or a minority race)
experiencing some adverse action (e.g., firing or not hiring) is roughly equal to
the proportion of non-members experiencing it. Courts have provided statistical
characterizations of disparate impact in a number of settings, such as the 80%
standard in employment [10]. Causal nondiscrimination demands protected at-
tributes do not cause people to experience some adverse action, which is the
core of disparate treatment. In short, to win a case under disparate treatment,
the plaintiff must show, among other things, that the defendant subjected the
plaintiff to some adverse action because of the plaintiff’s status as a member of a
protected class. For disparate treatment, the courts have used a common-sense
approach that looks at motivations. From it, we extract a mathematical char-
acterization that focuses on just casual processes, ignoring motivations, along
the lines of Pearl’s treatment of the issue [11].
Table 1 provides a summary of the relationships between privacy and non-
discrimination. It shows that properties for each norm vary along a binary axis
falling into one of two stances: an associative or causal one. We will call this
axis the dependence axis since association and causation are two forms of de-
pendence between random variables. (“Statistical independence” means a lack
of association. People often speak of “causal dependence”. Sometimes the word
is used ambiguously as in “the dependent variable”.) It further shows that for
each nondiscrimination property there is a corresponding privacy property.
As a result of the close correspondence between both stances of privacy and
nondiscrimination properties, we obtain a number of results ‘for free’, which we
describe in Section 8. In particular, the Dwork–Naor impossibility result [12]
translates to an impossibility of ensuring no disparate impact across arbitrary
subpopulations. Also, we point out research in both areas that can be repur-
posed to solve the corresponding problem in the other area.
Of course, privacy and nondiscrimination are not the same. While both deal
with statistical associations and causal effects, they differ in which associations
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Associative Causal
Nondiscrimination Disparate impact Disparate treatment
Privacy Statistical nondisclosure Differential privacy
Table 1: An informal summary of representative associative and causal nondis-
crimination and privacy properties. For each norm (row) and stance (column),
the table provides an example of a property approaching that norm from that
stance. We demonstrate that the core concepts of two rows are mathemati-
cally identical to one another We also show that columns represent a switch
between causal and associative dependence. Table 4 represents each point in
this grid in formal notation, exposing the structural correspondence between
these properties.
and causes are problematic. Furthermore, our simple models of nondiscrimi-
nation and privacy abstract away the nuances of these social norms, such as
exceptions to the general rules we represent. However, these differences play
little role in the mathematical analysis of or development of algorithms and
verification techniques for the core properties capturing these norms.
There is, however, a key difference between nondiscrimination and privacy
that is mathematically interesting: nondiscrimination focuses on adverse ac-
tions, whereas privacy sometimes deals with adverse actions but often deals
with knowledge. That is, while privacy and nondiscrimination share the depen-
dence axis along which their properties differ, privacy, unlike nondiscrimination,
has a second axis. This axis, the endpoint axis, captures the difference between
what has been called use privacy (e.g., [13]) and inferential privacy (e.g., [14]).
Use privacy is similar to nondiscrimination in that it prohibits some actions
from depending upon some sensitive fact. Inferential privacy is more abstract
in that it refers to the knowledge of an observer requiring that the observer
maintains some degree of ignorance of some sensitive fact.
The two forms of privacy are related, but not equivalent. An observer seeing
an outcome that depends upon a sensitive fact may gain information about the
sensitive fact, meaning that a lack of use privacy can imply a lack of inferential
privacy. Furthermore, an observer who knows the sensitive fact might use it to
choose outputs inappropriately, meaning that a lack of inferential privacy can
imply a lack of use privacy. However, in both cases, can imply does not mean
does imply. An observer not knowing the dependence between the sensitive fact
and the outputs gains no information and an observer may choose to not make
use of its knowledge to inappropriately select outputs.
The mathematically interesting difference between use privacy and inferen-
tial privacy is use privacy should be measured in frequentist probabilities (or,
more generally, physical probabilities), whereas inferential privacy should be
measured in Bayesian probabilities. Whereas the distinction between these two
approaches to probability theory may appear to be merely a philosophical de-
bate, we see here the practical distinctions between them.
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In summary, we have three axes along which to navigate the space of proper-
ties: (1) the norm: privacy or nondiscrimination, (2) the notion of dependence:
looking at either a change in association or in causation, and (3) for privacy, the
endpoint used: either measuring the change in use (frequentist probabilities) or
in knowledge (Bayesian).
We will explore and make precise these differences and relations in this paper.
We first cover background and provide an overview of our results in Sections 2
and 3. We then cover related work in Section 4. In Section 5, we present a set
of probabilistic definitions for formally stating causal and associative properties
of systems, and prove relationships between their various forms. In Sections 6
and 7, we instantiate parameters in these definitions to obtain different notions
of privacy and nondiscrimination respectively. Restating all properties in terms
of this common substrate also allows us to transfer known theorems and methods
about privacy to fairness, and vice versa, in Section 8.
2 Background
2.1 Probabilities, frequencies, and knowledge
Probabilities are a useful tool to characterize a number of different concepts.
In this work, we distinguish between frequentist and Bayesian probabilities, or,
more generally, between physical and epistemic probabilities.
Frequentist probabilities represent the frequencies of occurrence of events.
They are objective in that they measure a physical property of the world. They
are a useful model for representing outcomes of random coin flips or fractions of
populations with a certain property. Since they are often just called frequencies,
we denote frequentist probabilities using Fr. Frequentist conditioning restricts
events to a smaller population. For example, if O and G are random variables
representing a certain hiring outcome and gender respectively, then Fr[O =
‘Hired’ | G = ‘Female’] represents the frequency of women that are hired out of
the overall population, that is, the number of women hired divided by the size
of the population restricted to just the females. Note that in standard notation,
the overall population is left implicit.
(Some authors use frequentist and frequencies in a strict sense limited to the
case where the population size is infinite. They might refer to such probabilities
over finite populations as empirical frequencies or physical probabilities. We
note where this distinction may appear in our models of discrimination, but it
can be safely ignored.)
Bayesian (or epistemic) probabilities represent how certain a reasoning agent
is about propositions being true. They are subjective to the agent in that differ-
ent agents may differ in the probabilities they assign. Since they are often just
called credences, we denote Bayesian probabilities using Cr. Bayesian condition-
ing represents a knowledge update. For example Cr[O = ‘Hired’ | G = ‘Female’],
represents the certainty that a person was hired given that the agent knows that
he or she was female. This decision may also depend upon the agent’s back-
4
Concept Frequentist Bayesian
Probability Frequency Credence
Probability space Population Background knowledge
Conditioning Population restriction Knowledge revision
Association Co-occurrence Evidence (information leakage)
Table 2: Comparison of frequentist and Bayesian Concepts
ground knowledge, which is considered fixed for the whole probabilistic analysis.
Thus, similar to the implicit overall population for frequencies, the background
knowledge is typically left implicit.
In Table 2, we contrast a few probabilistic notions and their interpretations
in the frequentist and Bayesian views. In situations in this paper where results
apply to both forms, we denote probabilities using Pr.
2.2 Pearl’s Account of Causation
We recount Pearl’s theory of causation as background [11].
Definition 1. A causal model is a triple M = 〈U, V, F 〉 where U is a set of
variables, called background variables (or exogenous), V is set of variables, called
endogenous, and F is a set of functions f1, . . . , fn, called structural equations,
where each fi is a mapping that defines Vi in terms of all other variables in
U ∪ V .
We assume, as Pearl normally does, that the equations are recursive, that
is, there is an ordering on U ∪ V such that all of U comes before all of V , and
that for each fi, the variables in U ∪ V that it uses all come before Vi. Under
this assumption, given the values of the variables in U , one can compute the
value for any Vi in V by computing the values of each variable in that order
until reaching Vi. We use M.Vi(u) to denote the computed value.
An intervention do(X=x) on an endogenous variable X , in a model M ,
replaces the equation corresponding to X with x, resulting in a new model
MX=x.
Definition 2. A probabilistic causal model is a pair 〈M,B〉, whereM is a causal
model and B is a background probability function defined over the domain of
U , the background variables.
B makes the the probabilities assigned to background variables explicit,
whether that comes from an underlying population (frequentist) or background
knowledge (Bayesian). WFor an assignment u of values to all background vari-
ables U , we will write B(u) or Pr[U=u | B], depending upon context.
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For recursive models, the probabilities over background variables can be
lifted to a probability over an endogenous variable Y :
Pr[Y=y | B] =
∑
{u|M.Y (u)=y}
B(u).
The probability of counterfactual statements is defined by probabilities with
respect to the model MX=x.
Pearl prefers Bayesian probabilities [11], but they can be interpreted either
way. From a Bayesian viewpoint, where these probabilities represent beliefs,
the lifting of probabilities is only sensible under the assumption that the agent
knows the structural equations.
We modify our notation slightly make this assumption explicit by showing
the structural equations as explicit conditions in our probabilities. Typically, our
probabilities are of the form of Pr[ϕ | SE,B] where the context comprises of two
parts: the background probability distribution B and the structural equations
SE. SE represents structural equations that define endogenous variables. SE
contains exactly one structural equation for each endogenous variable of the
form X = f(Ui1 , . . . , Uik , Xj1 , . . . , Xjk), where Ui1 , . . . , Uik , Xj1 , . . . , Xjk are the
predecessors of X in the structural model.
An intervention on an endogenous variable X with value x in the model SE
is denoted by [X→x]SE, which replaces the equation for X in SE with X=x.
We assume that the background variables do not refer to or depend upon
the structural equations. In this case, since endogenous variables are defined
by structural equations when the rest of a probability expression only refers to
background variables, structural equations can be substituted. In other words,
the choice of structural equations is independent to all other background vari-
ables.
Assumption 3 (SE-independence). For each ϕ, consisting of only background
variables, and background distribution B for any sets of equations SE, SE′,
Pr[ϕ | SE,B] = Pr[ϕ | SE′, B]
When using Bayesian probabilities, or credences, the background distribu-
tion represents background knowledge of the agent doing the reasoning, which
we typically view as an adversary, and not some objective population of out-
comes. In this case, Assumption 3 means that adversary does not background
knowledge about the background variables that depends upon the structural
equations.
We will often consider structural equation models representing the system of
the following form: SE = {X=X, A=A, O=s(X, A)}, where X, A, O are endogenous
variables, and X and A are background. s represents a system that is the
subject of our privacy or nondiscrimination analysis. O represents its output. X
represents some sensitive attribute that, intuitively, s should not use to compute
O. X represents an input to the system representing X . A are other attributes
that the system intuitively may use and A is the input to s representing them.
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Similar to Tschantz et al. [9], we distinguish between the actual attribute X
and an input X representing it since we want to discuss how the system’s output
would change as its inputs change without considering all the other changes
that would follow from changing the actual value of the sensitive attribute.
For example, a causal intervention to a person’s race not only is conceptually
difficult to comprehend [15], but would have a wide range of effects, such as
likely resulting in a different spouse, address, and job, taking us far from the
system s. As a result, we don’t allow intervening on the race itself variable X
in our model, which is enforced by Pearl’s theory disallowing interventions on
background variables. On the other hand, since the endogenous variable X is an
input to well defined structural equations representing a system s, it is possible
to model the effects of intervening on the values of this variable. The same
reasoning applies to A and A.
In our work, we assume that an adversary has complete knowledge of the
model. While this is a standard assumption in cryptography and privacy, inter-
estingly, many leakage results do not apply to weaker adversaries with partial
knowledge about the model. In the weaker adversary model, observing outputs
can leak information about the model, which can then leak information about
secrets. However, this channel for information leakage is not permitted in the
case where the programs are completely known.
3 Overview
We categorize discrimination and privacy properties by the notion of dependence
they use: associative or causal (see Table 3). For each combination of norm and
notion of dependence, we provide a precise mathematical model of a point in
the space of fairness concepts. For the privacy concepts, which have already
been extensively studied by the CS research community, we sometimes find pre-
existing definitions occupying one of these points. In that case, we restate the
pre-existing definition in the standard form of Tschantz et al. [9] to make its
associative or causal nature apparent. We also note the kind of probability
employed. Statistical nondisclosure is a property about an adversary’s state
of knowledge and is therefore represented as credences. On the other hand,
differential privacy is a statement about the true distribution over the outcomes
of a program and is therefore represented by frequencies. We also briefly consider
an associative notion of privacy using frequencies and a causal notion using
credences.
The nondiscrimination properties come from complex legal tests that include
issues such as motivations and exceptions for unavoidable discrimination. We
will not model these tests in their completeness, but rather their core conceptions
of when discrimination (perhaps unavoidable and legal) occurs. Our models
show that they too boil down to associative and causal variants.
Our formalizations of all of these properties can be stated as a difference in
outcomes across changes in certain variables. Each of the properties is about
comparing some point of comparison for two values that the a sensitive or secret
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Associative Causal
Conditioning Intervention
Independence Causal Irrelevance
Association Influence
Table 3: Comparison of causal and associative conceptions of dependence
attribute S could have taken on. The property demands that the point of
comparison remains roughly the same whether S took on s or s′, meaning that
the attribute S plays at most a minor role in the determining the value of the
point of comparison.
For example, recall disparate treatment, the U.S. legal standard for when
people discriminated against because of having some protected attribute. In-
tuitively, determining whether a woman has suffered from disparate treatment
with respect to gender requires comparing two worlds: the actual world in which
the women is female and a hypothetical world in which she were a male. For
each world, one computes the probability of the women experiencing an adverse
outcome. This calculation, done twice, is the point of comparison for disparate
treatment.
For a more detailed example, recall that for a system s to have ǫ-differential
privacy the following must hold for all databases d and d′ that differ by one
person’s data and all outputs o:
Fr[s(d) = o] ≤ eǫ Fr[s(d′) = o] (1)
(For simplicity, we only deal with discrete data in this paper, removing the need
to consider sets of outputs.) The point of comparison for differential privacy
is the probability of s having various outputs for various databases. We will
denote this as Fr[s(d·) = o] highlighting that the database changes from d to d′
across the comparison by underlining it. In addition to the point of comparison,
differential privacy is also defined by over what databases the comparison is
made (those that differ by one entry), over what outputs o the comparison is
made (all of them), what the comparison demands (that · ≤ eǫ· holds). However,
focusing on the point of comparison highlights the differences between properties
we are interested in.
To make its causal form more apparent, following Tschantz et al., we will
rewrite differential privacy as
Fr[O=o | [X→x]SE] ≤ eǫ Fr[O=o | [X→x′]SE] (2)
using notation introduced in Section 2.2. O is a random variable representing
the output of the system s. X represents the entry that changes between the
two databases. x and x′ are the values by which the two databases differ, with
a special value ⊥ denoting that the entry is missing altogether. (We are using
the bounded model of differential privacy, which differs slightly from the original
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definition, but not in a way material to the points we wish to make.) Recall that
SE is the structural equations causally relating random variables. In particular,
X = X (3)
A = A (4)
O = s(X, A) (5)
where X is a background variable corresponding to the actual value of sensitive
attribute (the data point that changes), X is the input to the system that rep-
resents this attribute, A is a background variable corresponding to the actual
value of the other attributes (other data points), A is the input to the system
that represents these other attributes, and O is the output. Pr[O=o | [X→x]SE]
is the probability that the outcome variable O takes on the value o given that
a causal intervention set X to x. This causal intervention differs from standard
probabilistic conditioning in that it breaks correlations, preventing confounding,
similar to how randomization does so in experiments. Using this notation, the
point of comparison is Pr[O=o | [X→x·]SE)]
A more extreme privacy property, a probabilistic version of noninterfer-
ence [16], would demand equality:
Fr[O=o | [X→x]SE] = Fr[O=o | [X→x′]SE] (6)
For both differential privacy and noninterference, the point of comparison is the
same, but the comparison relation differs from · ≤ eǫ· and · = ·.
Since our work does not discuss the tradeoffs between various comparison
relationships, we will sometimes write just the point of comparison when dis-
cussing properties. Using this shorthand, Table 4 lists and organizes six rep-
resentative properties, or really representative clusters of properties. In each
case, we would have to also specify the comparison relation used and under
what conditions the comparison is to be done to fully specify the property, but
providing just point of comparison is sufficient to see the patterns that concern
us in this work.
Table 4 reveals a similarity in both stances on the notion of dependence to
use for privacy and nondiscrimination. The points of comparison are associative
in the left column and causal in the right. The properties in the left column
minimize or bound associations. The properties in the right column minimize
or bound causal effects.
The quadrant for associative privacy is unlike the others in that we show
two points of comparison belonging to this cluster of properties. The first point
of comparison, which we call indirect use privacy, shows the correspondence
between the four quadrants more clearly by differing from its neighbors in a
minimal number of ways. We could not find this point of comparison in prior
work, although it is related to Pufferfish Privacy [17], differing only by using
frequencies instead of credences. To help relate our four clusters to prior work,
we also show statistical nondisclosure, one of the most well known associative
privacy properties. This property differs from the other quadrants’ points of
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Associative (conditioning) Causal (intervening)
Discrimination Disparate impact for X in
population B:
Fr[O=o | X=x·, SE,B]
Disparate treatment on X for
individuals in B:
Fr[O=o | [X→x·]SE,B]
Privacy Indirect use privacy §6.3:
Fr[O=o | X=x·, SE,B]
Statistical nondisclosure of
secret X and knowledge B [1]:
Cr[X=x | O=o·, SE,B]
Noninterference [16] and
differential privacy [3] with
secret X:
Fr[O=o | [X→x·]SE,B]
Table 4: Key clusters of properties. For each cluster of properties, we show
just one or more of its points of comparison, the probabilities whose change in
value should be minimized or bounded as the underlined term changes values.
In some cases, more than one pre-existing property may arise depending upon
exactly how the comparison is made, exactly what is in secondary terms (e.g.,
B), and exactly under what circumstances the comparisons are made. For
example, the differences between noninterference and differential privacy include
that noninterference requires exact equality for any two values of X whereas
differential privacy requires approximate equality for only those values of X that
differs in a single person’s data.
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comparison by using credences and by flipping around the attributes that are
measured and conditioned upon. In Section 6, we take a closer look at the
differences between associative privacy definitions.
Moving across the columns of the two rows of Table 4, we see that for each
stance on privacy, there exists an identical stance on nondiscrimination, and vice
versa. This correspondence shows the tight relationship between privacy and
nondiscrimination, and the opportunity to reuse tools from one area of research
in the other.
Despite being identical at the level of abstraction shown in Table 4, privacy
and nondiscrimination are, of course, not the same. As mentioned, our models of
discrimination and privacy only account for the core essence of some conceptions
of these complex, multifaceted, and contested concepts. Additionally, the
secret or sensitive attribute X will be instantiated differently for the two
norms. For example, race and gender are quintessential instantiations of X
for nondiscrimination, but it is harder to argue that they should be kept secret
as an instantiation of X for privacy. Furthermore, the table contains statistical
nondisclosure without a corresponding property for nondiscrimination.
4 Related Work
While ours is the first comprehensive exploration of the correspondence between
causation and association, and privacy and nondiscrimination, prior work has
examined some of these connections in isolation.
Privacy and discrimination are similar. Implicitly making use of the
similarity between privacy and nondiscrimination, Dwork et al. define a notion
of fairness that requires that similar people be treated similarly, and formalize
this as a Lipschitz continuity requirement [18]. They point out the relationship
between this notion of fairness as continuity and differential privacy: that
differential privacy can be viewed as a special case of continuity for the Hamming
distance metric on databases. We analyze this relationship through a causal lens
and by casting both nondiscrimination and differential privacy as restrictions
on the causal use of information.
In more detail, mathematically, they use a metric d on individuals that
captures how similar they are with respect to the classification task. They also
use a second metric D over distributions of outcomes and represent classifiers
as a function M from individuals to distributions over outcomes. They require
that the (D, d)-Lipschitz property holds: for all pairs of individuals x and
y, D(M(x),M(y)) ≤ d(x, y). While they leave d largely abstract since it is
application specific, they mostly focus on two possibilities for D: statistical
distance (total variation norm) and the relative ℓ∞ metric. We focus on the
second here since it is more similar to the other definitions we have considered,
and to differential privacy in particular (their Section 2.3). In our notation
and treating it as a causal property, this would be the requirement that for all
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individuals x and y and outputs o,
Fr[O=o | [X→x]SE,B] ≤ ed(x,y)Fr[O=o | [X→y]SE,B] (7)
The point of comparison is Fr[O=o | [X→x·]SE,B], which is of the same form
as differential privacy, although, here, x ranges over individuals instead of
databases.
The authors object to group parity as insufficient for ensuring fairness,
although they do show conditions under which their condition implies group
parity (their Section 3), which are somewhat similar in goal to our Theorems 9
and 17, but rather different in form. Like us, they use the connection
between privacy and nondiscrimination to transport results from privacy to
nondiscrimination. While they focus on algorithmic results (their Section 5)
rather different from our focus on concepts and impossibility results, they do
informally consider issues (their Section 3.1, Example 3, and Section 6.3) similar
to ones we discuss in our Section 8.1.3.
A difference between our work and theirs is that we focus on prohibitions
against using a certain attribute X whereas they focus on a requirement to
use only a certain attribute implicitly defined by the metric d. While their
approach is principled, it differs from current antidiscrimination that places
prohibitions on using protected attributes (Section 7). One could attempt to
encode each approach into the other, but much of the intuition would be lost
even if successful.
Privacy and discrimination are different. Numerous works have instead
looked at how privacy and nondiscrimination are not the same. Dwork and
Mulligan write that approaching problems of discrimination with the tools
of privacy might just hide the discrimination [19]. Alan and Starr provide a
concrete example: the nondisclosure of criminal history appears to put pressure
on employees to discriminate by race as a proxy for the missing history [20].
Strahilevitz also considers how having more information can reduce the desire
to discriminate [21].
Privacy and causation. Tschantz et al. are the first to provide a formal
correspondence between causation and information flow [22], a result with
implications for security, privacy, and nondiscrimination. Others had previously
noted their relationship [23–25]. This paper follows on the current authors’
recent application of a similar correspondence to differential privacy [9], which
we believe is the first explicit use of causal reasoning in privacy research. This
viewpoint should not be confused with works that provide algorithms for causal
inference while providing differential privacy, such as Kusner et al.’s [26].
While we consider differential privacy (at least when using the centralized
model of data collection) to be an instance of use privacy, the study of use
privacy per se appears rather young. A recent PCAST report has called for more
emphasis on the appropriate use of data, instead of banning its collection [27].
Datta et al. consider use privacy and proxies [13].
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Privacy and association. The difference between associative privacy and
differential (casual) privacy has received much discussion, with some arguing for
associative definitions (e.g., [1,17,28–33]; see [34] for its antecedent in security)
and others for differential ones (e.g., [2–8]).
While associative properties have a more straightforward connection to
providing inferential privacy, that is, limiting the inferences of an adversary
from the data released, differential privacy can also be viewed as limiting
inferences. In particular, Kasiviswanathan and Smith provide theorems showing
that differential privacy implies a form of inferential privacy that limits how
much more an adversary can learn with an additional row in the database [6].
Others have looked implications of differential privacy about what the
adversary can learn from the released data in total given assumptions about
the adversary’s knowledge [35] or the data [36]. Others have looked at the
relationship between differential privacy and mutual information [37, 38].
Discrimination and causation. The importance of causal reasoning in
nondiscrimination goes back to at least Pearl, who uses it to deal with how
Simpson’s paradox can make it unclear which if either of the two groups is
discriminated against [11]. More recently, Hardt et al. re-examined this issue for
a broad class of nondiscrimination definitions [39,40]. Kilbertus et al. propose a
way of looking at this issue using causal reasoning about “proxy” and “resolving”
variables that are either prohibited or allowed for use [41]. Other causal notions
of fairness have been put forward by Kusner et al. [42], Bonchi et al. [43], and
Cowgill et al. [44].
Discrimination and association. Associative notions of disparate impact
have been the basis for a number of mechanisms for enforcing nondiscrimination
in statistical systems [45–48]. Recently a number of richer associative notions
of nondiscrimination have been proposed [40, 49, 50] that take into account
three variables, group membership, predicted outcome, and true outcome,
in various combinations. We believe our connection between privacy and
nondiscrimination can be extended from the simple associative notions to these
more complex ones, but leave it as future work.
Contrasting definitions in other ways. In this work, we focus on which
distributions privacy and nondiscrimination definitions compare, that is, on
what we call the point of comparison found in the definition. Mironov instead
contrasts privacy definitions based upon how different definitions use different
methods of doing the comparisons [51].
5 Probabilistic notions of dependence
Before turning to privacy or nondiscrimination, we consider some general
probabilistic notions that apply to both norms. In particular, we look at
properties that compare probability distributions, frequentist or Bayesian,
13
Notion Point of comparison Det. AR
Noninterference s(h·, l) 5 12
Associative independence Pr[O=o | X=x·, SE,B] 8 16
Associative independence Pr[X=x | O=o, SE,B] 18
Causal irrelevance Pr[O=o | [X→x·]SE,B] 4 13
Table 5: Summary of definitions. For each information flow property, we
present a version for deterministic systems (Det.) and an approximate version
for randomized systems (AR). The point of comparison is the quantity computed
twice, once for two different values, and compared to check whether they are
equal to one another. The check is for all pairs of values s and s′ that can go
in s· (or x and x′ for x·).
across two worlds. In this section, we define a number of such properties,
and prove relationships between them. In later sections, we instantiate these
properties to obtain privacy and nondiscrimination notions, as well as theorems
connecting these notions.
We first examine the simple case of properties for deterministic systems,
and then, in Section 5.2, we examine definitions with approximate guarantees
for randomized systems. We will typically state the properties as applied to our
setting, modeled by SE, even when the properties are more generally applicable
to any system of structural equations. Table 5 summarizes the properties we
consider and Figure 1 summarizes the relationships between them.
5.1 The deterministic perfect case
The first property we consider is causal irrelevance.
Definition 4 (Pearl [11]). A system SE = {O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A} has causal
irrelevance with respect to X to O for B iff for all x1, x2, and o,
Pr[O=o | [X→x1]SE,B] = Pr[O=o | [X→x2]SE,B]
For example, consider an experiment that randomly assigns a treatment of
x1 or x2 to a population modeled by B. The causal irrelevance property states
that the outcomes are identical irrespective of the treatment.
For systems with control over all inputs, one approach for achieving causal
irrelevance is to enforce noninterference. Here we state a simplification of
Goguen and Meseguer’s definition [16].
Definition 5. A function s(X, A) has noninterference for X iff for all x1, x2, and
a.
s(x1, a) = s(x2, a)
Noninterference yields causal irrelevance for all backgrounds B.
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Det. AR
Associative independence Def. 18
Associative independence Def. 8 Def. 16
Causal irrelevance Def. 4 Def. 13
Noninterference Def. 5 Def. 12
Thm. 19 Thm. 20 2ǫ
Thm. 9 A⊥X|B Thm. 17 A⊥X|B
Thm. 6 Thm. 14
Figure 1: Relationships between definitions. Notable assumptions made by
theorems and dilution of the privacy budget are shown as subscripts. A
deterministic form of the upper associative independence definition exists, but
we do not consider it.
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Theorem 6. Consider a system SE = {O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A}. If s has
noninterference with respect to X, then for all B it has causal irrelevance with
respect to X.
This theorem follows directly from the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Consider a system SE = {O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A}. If s has
noninterference with respect to X, then for all B and x,
Pr[O=o | [X→x]SE,B] = Pr[O=o | SE,B]
Proof. Assume s(X,A) has noninterference with respect to A. Then,
Pr[O=o | [X→x]SE,B]
=Pr[O=o | O=s(X, A), X=x, A=A,B] (expanding [X→x]SE)
=Pr[O=o | O=s(x, A), X=x, A=A,B] (substitution)
=Pr[O=o | O=s(X, A), X=x, A=A,B] (by noninterference)
=Pr[s(X,A)=o | O=s(X, A), X=x, A=A,B] (substitution)
=Pr[s(X,A)=o | O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A,B] (SE-independence)
=Pr[O=o | O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A,B] (substitution)
=Pr[O=o | SE,B]
The second kind of property that we consider is associative independence.
Definition 8. A system SE = {O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A} has associative
independence with respect to B iff for each x1, x2, and o such that Pr[X=x1 |
SE,B] > 0 and Pr[X=x2 | SE,B] > 0,
Pr[O=o | X=x1, SE,B] = Pr[O=o | X=x2, SE,B]
This is identical to stating that O⊥X | SE,B, that is, O and X are
conditionally independent with respect to B,SE.
Next, we show that if an input is independent of other inputs, then the
causal irrelevance of that input is equivalent to the associative independence of
that input.
Theorem 9. Consider a system SE = {O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A}. If A⊥X | B
and for all x, Pr[X = x | B] > 0, then SE has associative independence with
respect to X for B iff SE has probabilistic causal irrelevance with respect to X
for B.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 10.
Lemma 10. Consider a system SE = {O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A}. If X⊥A | B,
and Pr[X = x | SE,B] > 0,
Pr[O=o | X=x, SE,B] = Pr[O=o | [X→x]SE,B]
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Proof. Assume that X⊥A | B. Then,
Pr[A=a | B] = Pr[A=a | B,X=x] (8)
Pr[A=a | SE,B] = Pr[A=a | X=x, SE,B] (9)
where (9) follows from SE-independence. Thus,
Pr[O=o | X=x, SE,B]
=Pr[s(x,A)=o | X=x, SE,B] (substituting for X, O)
=Pr[s(x,A)=o | SE,B] (from (9) above)
=Pr[s(x,A)=o | [X→x]SE,B] (SE-independence)
=Pr[O=o | [X→x]SE,B]
5.2 Making things approximate
We now consider the case of systems with internal randomness. We model such
systems as {O=s(X, A, R), X=X, A=A}, where R is a background variable that
represents fresh randomness.
Definition 11. A random variable R with distribution BR is said to be fresh
for B iff for all ϕ that does not reference R and all r, Fr[R=r | BR] = Pr[R=r |
ϕ,B].
The left hand side represents the true frequency distribution of a random
variable R according to BR. The freshness condition can be instantiated for
both frequentist and Bayesian probabilities. For frequentist probabilities, this
condition can be interpreted as R being uncorrelated with any other background
variables. For Bayesian probabilities this condition can be interpreted as the
agent knowing nothing about R apart from its natural frequentist distribution
BR. Since R has the same distribution under BR and B when it is fresh, we
will not mention BR when R is fresh for B.
Also, instead of requiring equalities, we allow the probabilities above to be
approximately equal, arriving at a version of differential privacy for functions.
Definition 12. A function s(X,A,R) has ǫ-noninterference for X given a
distribution B over R iff for all x1, x2, and a,
Fr[s(x1, a, R)=o | B] ≤ e
ǫ Fr[s(x2, a, R)=o | B]
Note that the only role B plays in Definition 12 is assigning a probability
distribution to the randomization within s provided by R.
Definition 13. For a system SE = {O=s(X, A, R), X=X, A=A}, X has
ǫ-probabilistic causal irrelevance for O with respect to B iff for all x1, x2, and
o,
Pr[O=o | [X→x1]SE,B] ≤ e
ǫ Pr[O=o | [X→x2]SE,B]
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Theorem 14. If s(X,A,R) has ǫ-noninterference, then for each B such that R
is fresh, X has ǫ-probabilistic causal irrelevance for O with respect to B, given
SE = {O=s(X, A, R), X=X, A=A}.
Proof. Assume s has ǫ-noninterference. Therefore,
Pr[O=o | [X→x1]SE,B]
=
∑
a
Pr[O=o | A=a, [X→x1]SE,B] Pr[A=a | [X→x1]SE,B]
=
∑
a
Pr[O=o | A=a, [X→x1]SE,B] Pr[A=a | B] (exogeneity)
=
∑
a
Pr[s(x1, a, R)=o | A=a, [X→x1]SE,B] Pr[A=a | B]
=
∑
a
Fr[s(x1, a, R)=o | A=a,B] Pr[A=a | B] (SE-independence)
=
∑
a
Fr[s(x1, a, R)=o | B] Pr[A=a | B] (R fresh)
≤
∑
a
eǫ Fr[s(x2, a, R)=o | B] Pr[A=a | B] (noninterference of R and B)
= eǫ
∑
a
Pr[s(x2, a, R)=o | A=a,B] Pr[A=a | B] (R fresh)
= eǫ
∑
a
Pr[s(x2, a, R)=o | A=a, [X→x1]SE,B] Pr[A=a | B]
(SE-independence)
= eǫ
∑
a
Pr[s(x2, a, R)=o | A=a, [X→x2]SE,B] Pr[A=a | B]
= eǫ Pr[O=o | [X→x2]SE,B]
Corollary 15. If s(X,A,R) has ǫ-noninterference, then for all B such that R
is fresh, for all x and o,
Pr[O=o | SE,B] ≤ eǫ Pr[O=o | [X→x]SE,B], and
Pr[O=o | [X→x]SE,B] ≤ eǫ Pr[O=o | SE,B]
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Proof.
Pr[O=o | SE,B]
=
∑
x′
Pr[O=o | X=x′, SE,B] Pr[X=x′ | SE,B]
=
∑
x′
Pr[O=o | X=x′, [X→x′]SE,B] Pr[X=x′ | [X→x′]SE,B]
(substituting for X)
≤eǫ
′∑
x
Pr[O=o | X=x′, [X→x]SE,B] Pr[X=x′ | SE,B] (Theorem 14)
=eǫ Pr[O=o | [X→x]SE,B]
The other direction follows similarly.
Definition 16. A system SE = {O=s(X, A, R), X=X, A=A} has ǫ-probabilistic
associative independence on O with respect to X for B iff for each x1, x2 and o
such that Pr[X=x1 | SE,B] > 0 and Pr[X=x2 | SE,B] > 0,
Pr[O=o | X=x1, SE,B] ≤ e
ǫ Pr[O=o | X=x2, SE,B]
ǫ-probabilistic associative independence coincides with causal irrelevance
when the sensitive input is independent of other inputs.
Theorem 17. Consider a system SE = {O=s(X, A, R), X=X, A=A}. If X⊥A|B,
and R is fresh, then, for SE, X has ǫ-probabilistic associative independence for
O with respect to B iff X has ǫ-probabilistic causal irrelevance for O with respect
to B.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 10.
Finally, we show that the two forms of associative independence considered
in Table 5 are not that different. Approximate associative notions of dependence
may relax independence in a number of different ways. The form of approximate
associative independence in Definition 16 is employed by the Pufferfish privacy
formalism [17,29]. Statistical nondisclosure is a different form that for Bayesian
probabilities compares posterior beliefs to prior beliefs [1]. An approximate form
dropping the requirement of Bayesian probabilities follows:
Definition 18. A system SE = {O=s(X, A, R), X=X, A=A} has ǫ-probabilistic
associative independence on X with respect to O for B iff for each x1, x2, and
o such that Pr[O=o | SE,B] > 0,
Pr[X=x | O=o, SE,B] ≤ eǫ Pr[X=x | SE,B] and (10)
Pr[X=x | SE,B] ≤ eǫ Pr[X=x | O=o, SE,B] (11)
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We show here that the two formulations are very closely related. Since
the structural equations SE, and background B don’t change throughout this
section, we elide them from the statements in the rest of this section.
Theorem 19. If for all o, x1, and x2, such that Pr[X=x1 | SE,B] > 0 and
Pr[X=x2 | SE,B] > 0,
Pr[O=o | X=x1, SE,B] ≤ e
ǫ Pr[O=o | X=x2, SE,B]
then, for all o and x such that Pr[O=o | SE,B] > 0,
Pr[X=x | O=o, SE,B] ≤ eǫ Pr[X=x | SE,B]
and
Pr[X=x | SE,B] ≤ eǫ Pr[X=x | O=o, SE,B]
Proof. Assume for all o, x1, and x2 such that Pr[X=x1 | SE,B] > 0 and
Pr[X=x2 | SE,B] > 0,
Pr[O=o | X=x1, SE,B] ≤ e
ǫ Pr[O=o | X=x2, SE,B]
This implies that, for all o, x1, and x2 such that Pr[X=x1 | SE,B] > 0 and
Pr[X=x2 | SE,B] > 0,
Pr[O=o | X=x1, SE,B] Pr[X=x2 | SE,B]
≤ eǫ Pr[O=o | X=x2, SE,B] Pr[X=x2 | SE,B] (12)
Since (12) holds for all x2 such that Pr[X=x2 | SE,B] > 0, the following must
also hold, for all o and x1 such that Pr[X=x1 | SE,B] > 0:
∑
x2∈X
′
Pr[O=o | X=x1, SE,B] Pr[X=x2 | SE,B] ≤
∑
x2∈X
′
eǫ Pr[O=o | X=x2, SE,B] Pr[X=x2 | SE,B]
Pr[O=o | X=x1, SE,B]
∑
x2∈X
′
Pr[X=x2 | SE,B] ≤ e
ǫ
∑
x2∈X
′
Pr[O=o | X=x2, SE,B] Pr[X=x2 | SE,B]
Pr[O=o | X=x1, SE,B] ∗ 1 ≤ e
ǫ
∑
x2∈X
Pr[O=o ∧X=x2 | SE,B]
Pr[O=o | X=x1, SE,B] ≤ e
ǫ Pr[O=o | SE,B]
Pr[O=o | X=x1, SE,B] Pr[X=x1 | SE,B] ≤ e
ǫ Pr[O=o | SE,B] Pr[X=x1 | SE,B]
where X2 is the range of X and X ′ is the support of X given SE and B:
{x ∈ X | Pr[X=x | SE,B] > 0}. From this it follows that for all o and x1 such
that Pr[O=o | SE,B] > 0 and Pr[X=x1 | SE,B] > 0:
Pr[O=o | X=x1, SE,B] Pr[X=x1 | SE,B]
Pr[O=o | SE,B]
≤ eǫ Pr[X=x1 | SE,B]
Pr[X = x1 | O=o, SE,B] ≤ e
ǫ Pr[X=x1 | SE,B]
In the case where Pr[X=x1 | SE,B] = 0, the final inequality also holds since
both sides are 0.
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Similarly, we can show that
Pr[X = x1 | SE,B] ≤ e
ǫ Pr[X=x1 | O=o, SE,B]
Theorem 20. If for all o and x such that Pr[O=o | SE,B] > 0,
Pr[X=x | O=o, SE,B] ≤ eǫ Pr[X=x | SE,B]
and
Pr[X=x | SE,B] ≤ eǫ Pr[X=x | O=o, SE,B]
then, for all o, x1, and x2, such that Pr[X=x1 | SE,B] > 0 and Pr[X=x2 |
SE,B] > 0,
Pr[O=o | X=x1, SE,B] ≤ e
2ǫ Pr[O=o | X=x2, SE,B]
Proof. Assume for all o and x such that Pr[O=o | SE,B] > 0,
Pr[X=x | O=o, SE,B] ≤ eǫ Pr[X=x | SE,B]
From this and Bayes’s Rule, it follows that for all o and x such that Pr[O=o |
SE,B] > 0 and Pr[X=x | SE,B] > 0,
Pr[O=o | X=x, SE,B] Pr[X=x | SE,B]
Pr[O=o | SE,B]
≤ eǫ Pr[X=x | SE,B]
Pr[O=o | X=x, SE,B] ≤ eǫ Pr[O=o | SE,B]
The last line also holds in the case where Pr[O=o | SE,B] > 0 since both sides
will be zero.
Similarly, we can show that for all o and x such that Pr[X=x | SE,B] > 0,
Pr[O = o | SE,B] ≤ eǫ Pr[O=o | X=x, SE,B]
Putting the two together, we get for all o, x1, and x2 such that Pr[X1=x1 |
SE,B] > 0 and Pr[X2=x2 | SE,B] > 0,
Pr[O=o | X=x1, SE,B] ≤ e
ǫ Pr[O=o | SE,B] ≤ e2ǫ Pr[O=o | X=x2, SE,B]
6 Privacy
We now instantiate the definitions above to obtain various definitions of privacy
reported in prior work. We will organize this section around the two types
of privacy definitions found in Table 4. For each type, we will first discuss
its general nature and then relate it to the most well known formal notion of
privacy, differential privacy.
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6.1 Direct Use Privacy: Frequentist Causal Irrelevance
The first kind of privacy requirements we examine is direct use privacy, which
requires that some data be not used to produce some output. One way of
formalizing non-use is Pearl’s notion of causal irrelevance, which holds if the
outcomes over a population represented by B are identical when the sensitive
input is intervened on. Since in this section we will be using more than one
type of background distribution B, we will denote ones modeling populations
as BP . This view is the basis for Tschantz et al.’s prior work on inferring
information use by detecting causation [22]. Their work started with noninter-
ference, the classic security property formalizing information flow [16], which
is mathematically equivalent to direct use privacy despite the difference in
application. It showed that noninterference is equivalent to Pearl’s notion of
causation. That is, absolute direct use privacy holds iff for all o, x1, x2, and
BP ,
Fr[O=o | [X→x1]SE,BP ] = Fr[O=o | [X→x2]SE,BP ] (13)
where SE = {O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A} as usual. Differential privacy can be
understood as a relaxation of this property, which we’ll cover in detail below.
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy is a relaxed form of direct use
privacy. It can be expressed as either ǫ-noninterference or ǫ-causal irrelevance for
database rows. For the setting of database privacy, where a function operates
on a database comprising a set of rows, differential privacy requires that the
distribution over outcomes is not significantly affected by the value of a single
row in the database.
Definition 21. A system s(d,R), operating over a data set d has ǫ-differential
privacy iff for all rows i, databases d, and row values x, x′, and outputs o
Fr[s(d−ix,R) = o] ≤ e
ǫ Fr[s(d−ix
′, R)]
In the definition above, for a database d, d−i refers to the remainder of the
database with the row indexed by i left out, and d−ix refers to the database
d with the value x in row i. We allow a special value ⊥ for x or x′ where
d−i⊥ denotes the database without replacing the ith entry. (This is the so-call
bounded formulation of differential privacy.) In the notation we used before, d−i
can be thought of as the value of A and x as the value of X with the split of the
data points into A and X varying with the value of i. R, as before, represents
the randomness used by s. That is, differential privacy is ǫ-noninterference with
respect to each row in the database. It means that intervening on any row does
not affect the distribution over outcomes significantly.
Proposition 22. A function s(D,R), where D = 〈D1, · · · , Dk〉, has
ǫ-differential privacy iff for each i, s(D,R) has ǫ-noninterference with respect to
Di.
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This equivalence follows directly from the definitions. Moreover, we can
express differential privacy as causal irrelevance:
Proposition 23. Consider system defined by the structural equations SE =
{O=s(D, R), A=A, D1=D1, . . . , Dk=Dk}. The function s has ǫ-differential privacy
iff for all i and all x1 and x2, and for all BP ,
Fr[s(D, R) | [Di→x1]SE,BP ] = e
ǫ Fr[s(D, R) | [Di→x2]SE,BP ]
where we use D as short for 〈D1, . . . , Dk〉.
This equivalence is the corollary of Theorem 14. Tschantz et al. provide
details [9].
6.2 Associative Inferential Privacy: Bayesian Associative
Independence
Associative inferential privacy tries to capture the change in the beliefs of
an adversary after observing the outcome of a program. This notion is well
captured by measuring the difference in the Bayesian distributions representing
the adversary’s beliefs with and without conditioning on the outcome. That
is, if ϕ is the proposition of interest that the adversary is attempting to
learn about, we compare Cr[ϕ | O=o,BK ] to Cr[ϕ | BK ] where BK is a
background distribution representing the adversary’s background knowledge
about background variables. Given that the definition we consider in this
section does not use causal interventions, BK can more generally refer to any
background knowledge. In the absolute case, we require that
Cr[ϕ | O=o,BK ] = Cr[ϕ | BK ] (14)
This concept goes back to at least Dalenius in 1977 as statistical nondisclo-
sure [1]. The definition looks more familiar if we consider the special case where
ϕ is X = x:
Cr[X=x | O=o,BK ] = Cr[X=x | BK ] (15)
This requirement is closely related to a similar special case Pufferfish
privacy [17, 29]:
Cr[O=o | X=x1, SE,BK ] = Cr[O=o | X=x2, SE,BK ] (16)
Section 5.2 shows approximate forms of these requirements that, similar to
differential privacy allows them to differ by a factors of eǫ. The section also
shows that they are nearly equivalent, with the relaxation of (16) implying the
relaxation of (15) and the relaxation of (15) implying the relaxation of (16)
with the privacy budget diluted from ǫ to 2ǫ.
Other approaches to measuring an associative difference include measuring
a notion of accuracy [52] or a difference in beliefs over the runs of a system [53].
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Such associative inferential requirements are hard to meet. Typically, we
would not know the background knowledge of the adversary. In the worst
case, we might need to consider any background knowledge as possible. Dwork
and Naor have shown that it is impossible, in general, to both satisfy this
requirement for all background knowledge sets BK and release an output O
providing utility [12]. In Section 8.1, we review and re-present Dwork and
Naor’s proof.
Differential Privacy implies Associative Inferential Privacy for In-
dependent Data Points. One way to get around the aforementioned
impossibility result is to attain the property for a restricted set of background
knowledge. If we require that the data points be independent under the
adversary’s background knowledge, then differential privacy implies associative
inferential privacy. We can now use the results proved in Section 5.2 for
differential privacy.
The implication states that for background knowledge such that each row is
independent, conditioning on the value of a row does not change the beliefs about
the outcomes. The requirement for independence to obtain such an epistemic
guarantee has been pointed out in prior work [17,29], and follows directly from
Theorem 14 and Theorem 17.
Proposition 24. Consider a system SE = {O=s(D, R), D=D, A=A} and D =
〈D1, · · ·Dk〉, and D = 〈D1, · · · , Dk〉. If Di⊥D−i|BK for all i, and R is fresh,
then for all i, di, d′i, and o,
Cr[O=o | Di = di, SE,BK ] ≤ e
ǫCr[O=o | Di = d
′
i, SE,BK ]
if s is ǫ-differentially private.
Another reasonable restriction on background knowledge is to tie the
background knowledge to an objective population frequency distribution: the
distribution that captures the associations known about a population or set of
populations. This approach has its own challenges that we discuss below.
6.3 Indirect Use Privacy: Frequentist Associative Inde-
pendence
Above, we considered a frequentist causal property and a Bayesian associative
property. Here, we consider the possibility of a frequentist associative notion
of privacy. Let indirect use privacy be the requirement that the output is not
statistically associated with the sensitive attribute X . For a population BP ,
absolute indirect use privacy holds iff for all o, x1, and x2,
Fr[O=o | X=x1, SE,BP ] = Fr[O=o | X=x2, SE,BP ]
where SE = {O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A} as usual. This property can be understood
as a more objective version of associative inferential privacy. That notion of
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privacy is subjective in the sense that it depends upon the state of knowledge
of an adversary. This definition replaces that background knowledge BK
with the actual population BP as it switches from credences to frequencies,
making it more objective by instead referring to the state of the outside world.
Furthermore, this requirement will imply associative inferential privacy for
adversaries whose background knowledge is limited to knowing the population.
Indirect use privacy prevents the release of any output that is associated
with the sensitive attribute, even if that release is not caused by the sensitive
attribute. For example, suppose the sensitive attribute X is whether someone
has cancer. Indirect use privacy would prevent the release of whether someone
smokes, which is typically public knowledge, as the output O since it is
associated with getting cancer.
Generally, the population BP might not be completely known to whoever
designs the system. Guaranteeing indirect use privacy, in this case, requires
meeting the definition for all populations BP that the designer believes to be
possible. In the extreme case, this would require protecting the information for
all populations BP , leading to the same impossibility result as for associative
inferential privacy.
Perhaps due to how strong this requirement is, we do not know of any
work that attempts to achieve this requirement for a comprehensive class of
populations BP . However, some prior works can be viewed as can be viewed as
approximations of this requirement. We will discuss two such approximations,
one for privacy in general and one related to differential privacy in particular.
Proxies. Prior work has prohibited the direct use of proxies, which are
variables statistically associated with the sensitive attribute X (e.g., [54]), for
example ZIP Codes and race. Directly using a variable that is associated with
X is required to violate indirect use privacy assuming that the system cannot
predict the value of X a priori. However, proxies may be used as inputs without
introducing associations between the outcomes and sensitive attributes, such as
the use of ZIP Code to target geographic locations that may have heterogeneous
racial demographics. Identifying the use of proxies in a system exposes points
at which normative judgments can be made about the acceptable use of proxies.
Inferential Guarantees from Differential Privacy. Ghosh and Kleinberg
reason about what an adversary could learn from a differentially private data
release when the adversary’s knowledge is characterized by the correlations in
the underlying population [14]. In our notation, this corresponds to assuming
that BK is determined by BP . They show that the amount of associative
inferential privacy lost is bounded when the correlations in BP are bounded
in particular ways.
Definitions Going Beyond Differential Privacy. Recall that
Proposition 24 showing that differential privacy implies a form of associative
inferential privacy under the pre-condition that the data points are independent
under the adversary’s background knowledge BK . That pre-condition is not
optional: numerous works have noted that the output of a differentially private
function can allow an adversary to draw an inference about a single data point
due to output still being strongly associated (more so than by a factor of eǫ)
with the data point (e.g., [17, 28–33]). Some of these authors have responded
by proposing definitions that are similar to differential privacy but requiring
that a larger set of databases are treated as neighboring [17, 29, 31–33]. This
means that the algorithm will have to produce nearly identical (within a
factor of eǫ) distributions over outputs for more pairs of databases. Intuitively,
these additional pairs of databases are ones that differ not in the data point
Di currently under consideration, but rather other data points Dj that are
closely associated with Di. By requiring the output to not depend much upon
these associates, such definitions are similar to proxy prohibitions where the
correlated data points Dj are treated as the prohibited proxies. By prohibiting
their use, these definitions attempt to avoid a strong association Between the
output and a single data point. Between this motivation and being implemented
as a restriction over outputs, these definitions are similar to indirect use privacy
in the same sense as proxy prohibitions are similar.
6.4 Causal Inferential Privacy
We have seen Bayesian associative notions of privacy and frequentist causal ones.
This raises the question of what Bayesian causal ones exist. Intuitively, such
causal epistemic properties require that intervening on the sensitive attribute
does not change significantly an observer’s beliefs about any proposition ϕ about
the background.
A trivial way of getting such a requirement is to replace the frequencies in the
causal notion of privacy found in Section 6.1 (13) with Bayesian probabilities.
Given Pearl’s preference for using Bayesian probabilities [11], such a replace
would bring our causal notion into closer correspondence to his model of
causation.
However, doing such a wholesale replace ignores the distinction between
probabilities measuring properties of a population BP and properties of the
adversary’s background knowledge BK . A more nuanced approach would
use both forms of probabilities, combining frequencies, credences, causal
interventions. We leave this effort to future work.
Semantic (Differential) Privacy. Kasiviswanathan and Smith provide a
“semantic” version of differential privacy, which they call semantic privacy [6].
It requires that the probability that the adversary assigns to the all input data
points does not change much whether an individual i submits data or not. While
they did not express their definition in terms of causation, we conjuncture
that this definition could be expressed in such terms, using a combination
of frequencies and credences. Indeed, while they do not formally distinguish
between frequencies and credences, their notation suggests such a distinction
as they classify some probabilities as coming from the algorithm (their Pr)
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and others from the adversary’s beliefs (their b). Kasiviswanathan and Smith
prove that differential privacy and semantic (differential) privacy are closely
related [6, Thm. 2.2], and such a result should also apply to our causal view.
7 Nondiscrimination
Similar properties to the ones discussed above appear as nondiscrimination
properties. For example, group parity, a nondiscrimination property that the
frequency of individuals hired from a protected group be similar to the frequency
of individuals hired from the rest of the population, is an associative notion.
Furthermore, the use of a protected attribute such as race or gender can be
viewed as a causal property, and is an important part of the concept of disparate
treatment.
Much as differential privacy served as a point of reference for understanding
the forms of privacy properties, we use the U.S. legal notions of disparate
treatment and disparate impact here. However, whereas, differential privacy
fit squarely under one of our forms of privacy, the situation is more complex
here due to the complexity of the law.
7.1 Direct Nondiscrimination: Frequentist Causal Irrele-
vance
The first kind of nondiscrimination requirements we examine is direct non-
discrimination, which requires that some protected attribute not be used to
produce some output. As with direct use privacy, we formalize non-use as
Pearl’s notion of causal irrelevance. That is, absolute direct nondiscrimination
holds iff for all o, x1, x2, and BP ,
Fr[O=o | [X→x1]SE,BP ] = Fr[O=o | [X→x2]SE,BP ]
where SE = {O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A} as usual. This property is identical
absolute direct use privacy. However, for privacy, the variable X would
intuitively be some attribute kept private, perhaps a medical diagnosis, whereas
for nondiscrimination, the variable X would intuitively be some protected
attribute. For example, X could be gender or race, which are typically publicly
known.
Disparate Treatment. The above formulation is related to the legal notion
of disparate impact. In U.S. law, Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2) contains
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer –
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
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employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or [. . . ]
Disparate treatment is one way in which this provision could be violated. The
other is disparate impact, which we turn to next. The U.S. Supreme Court has
described disparate treatment as follows [55, Footnote 15]:
“Disparate treatment” such as is alleged in the present case is the
most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply
treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive
is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the
mere fact of differences in treatment.
This definition leaves some ambiguity about whether unintentional but causal
discrimination counts as disparate treatment. For example, suppose an employer
harbors a subconscious basis against women that causes him to not hire them
despite being unaware of it. Arguably, sex would be the cause of less favorable
treatment, but without intent.
We suspect that such ambiguity has not posed problems in legal cases for
two reasons. First, proving, outside of a laboratory setting, the existence of such
a subconscious bias and its role in decision making is so difficult that such cases
are unlikely to arise due to a lack of evidence. Second, these difficulties do not
apply to showing disparate impact, providing plaintiffs with an easier alternative
course of action in such cases, which means that few would feel tempted to push
the envelope on what counts as disparate treatment.
Turning to automated systems, this ambiguity may need to be addressed.
Some have argued that machines can, in a sense, have intent (e.g., [56]), but,
arguably, they cannot. With this in mind, perhaps, the notion of disparate
treatment is best limited to humans. However, we are interested in the case
where a system uses protected information about a person to select an outcome,
that is, systems in which the protected output causes the outcome. Such cases
are violations of direct nondiscrimination and would be illegal under the quotes
above given a causal interpretation of the word because found in them both.
While this interpretation loses some of the nuances of intent, we believe it
maintains the essence of the stance that gives raise to it: no one should be
treated poorly as an effect their protected attributes.
Under this view, at a high level, showing disparate treatment requires
establishing direct discrimination. Experimental methods such as randomized
controlled experiments and situation testing over populations can establish such
causation.
In practice, disparate treatment cases look little like scientific studies
establishing causation for two reasons. First, running such experiments over
actual workplaces is typically impossible except in limited circumstances (see,
e.g., [57]). Second, winning a disparate treatment case is more complex
than just showing direct discrimination. For one, nondiscrimination laws only
cover certain entities making certain types of decisions. Further complicating
28
matters, exceptions exist. For example, a gym will typically be able to defend
hiring only females to attend its women’s locker room as a bona fide occu-
pational qualification, which permits an exception to the prohibitions against
employment discrimination. Furthermore, showing direct discrimination yields
little reward in mixed-motives cases. For example, the defendant may show
that even if it had not discriminated against the plaintiff, the plaintiff would
still not have been hired for some other legal reason, such as lacking a required
quantification. In such cases, under U.S. law, the defendant does not receive
damages (42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(2)(B)).
For these reasons, legal formulations and case law surrounding disparate
treatment centers around discrimination against individuals [58, Chapter 10.1],
where a plaintiff claims that a protected attribute was a sole reason or motivating
factor for some adverse action against them and had it not been for the
protected attribute the adverse action would not have happened. (Meanwhile,
the defendant typically claims that this is not the case and offers other lawful
reasons that supposedly motivated the adverse action.) Showing that the
adverse action would not have happened to a particular plaintiff (not just a
claim about a population of plaintiffs) means showing not just causation but
the more complex property called actual causation. (What we are calling causa-
tion is more precisely known as type causation when contrasting it with actual
causation.) Actual causation is formally identified using analytical methods
(e.g., [59]). Practically, this relies on indirect ways of establishing causation
such as verbal claims or inconsistencies in applying rules [60].
For these reasons, we only claim that the core essence of disparate treatment
is reduced to a question of causation.
7.2 Indirect Discrimination: Frequentist Associative In-
dependence
Another form of discrimination happens when a policy or system has
disproportionate impacts upon one group by lacking group parity. We call
this indirect discrimination. It is defined in a similar manner as indirect use
privacy: the output is not statistically associated with the sensitive attribute
X . Absolute indirect nondiscrimination holds iff there is frequentist associative
independence: for all o, x1, x2, and BP ,
Fr[O=o | X=x1, SE,BP ] = Fr[O=o | X=x2, SE,BP ]
where SE = {O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A} as usual. As before, X is intuitively a
protected attribute, such as gender or race, instead of a private attribute.
Preventing indirect discrimination (ensuring group parity) is the basis for a
number technical approaches for nondiscrimination in machine learning [47,48,
61, 62].
Disparate Impact. Whereas the disparate treatment form of illegal
discrimination looked at employment practices that directly treat protected
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groups differently from others, disparate impact is a form of illegal
discrimination that can arise when even facially neutral policies lead to indirect
discrimination. In employment law, the 80 percent rule [10] is used to test
whether an employer’s selection system has a disproportionate impact on
protected groups by measuring the ratio of positive outcomes across groups.
If the ratio is less than 0.8, then the employer may be called upon to explain
this disparity.
Proposition 25. The 80 percent rule is satisfied by a system iff it has
ǫ-frequentist associative independence for protected groups, where e−ǫ = 0.8.
Failing the 80 percent rule does not, in itself, mean that the employer will
be found liable for disparate impact. As with disparate treatment, only certain
entities are covered and exceptions exist. For example, the employer will not
be held liable if the practice with a disparate impact is a business necessity.
Thus, similarly, we do not claim that all of disparate impact can be reduced to
a statistical test, but its core concept can be.
8 Results for Free
Having recognized the relationship between privacy and nondiscrimination, we
get theorems and methods from one for the other at no additional cost. This
motivates the case for the exchange of techniques between the communities
studying the two independently. In particular, the Dwork–Naor impossibility
result for statistical disclosure [12] translates to an impossibility result for
fairness that states that there will always exist a subpopulation for which a
system violates group parity. Further, we identify techniques in probabilistic
program analysis and data privacy geared towards minimizing quantitative
information flow that can be used to enforce nondiscrimination. Finally, we
mention ideas for generalizing the definitions found in this work that can apply
to either value.
8.1 Dwork–Naor’s Impossibility Result
Dwork and Naor showed the impossibility of statistical nondisclosure
(associative inferential privacy) when releasing useful outputs [12]. That
theorem will carry over for discrimination.
They write [12, p. 1]:
The intuition behind the proof of impossibility is captured by the
following parable. Suppose one’s exact height were considered a
sensitive piece of information, and that revealing the exact height
of an individual were a privacy breach. Assume that the database
yields the average heights of women of different nationalities. An
adversary who has access to the statistical database and the
auxiliary information “Terry Gross is two inches shorter than the
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average Lithuanian woman” learns Terry Gross’ height, while anyone
learning only the auxiliary information, without access to the
average heights, learns relatively little.
Generalizing this parable to sensitive conditions other than Terry Gross’ height
and to computations other than the average, requires characterizing the sensitive
conditions, computations, and adversaries for which such reasoning holds.
Dwork and Naor do so for a fairly general characterization. We will do so
for a narrower but simpler characterization, which allows making the points we
wish to make more straightforward.
To understand our characterization, first note that the reasoning in the
parable requires that the sensitive condition is not already known to the
adversary. So a straightforward way of generalizing it would be
For all informative computations s, outputs o, and sensitive
conditions ϕ, there exists some background condition B such that ϕ
is not known from B and SE, but ϕ will become known upon seeing
that the output is o.
The auxiliary information that “Terry Gross is two inches shorter than the
average Lithuanian woman” can be generalized to O=o implies ϕ (or ¬ϕ if ϕ is
actually false). However, this does not hold. The reason is that such auxiliary
knowledge along with SE (which is assumed to be known by all) can alone
imply that ϕ holds. One reason this is possible is that ϕ can just follow from
SE. Alternatively, O=o might follow from SE. More complicatedly, ϕ might be
known to hold for every output other than o from SE. In this case, the auxiliary
information covers the only case where ϕ was not known to hold, implying that
ϕ holds without needing to see the output. (Appendix A provides such a case.)
Rather than consider the possibility that some more complex auxiliary
information could deal with this case, we instead prove a more restricted
theorem. Intuitively, it is
For all informative computations s, outputs o, and sensitive
conditions ϕ whose truth or falsehood is not simply known from
any of the outputs, there exists some auxiliary information B such
that ϕ is not known from B and SE, but ϕ will become known upon
seeing that the output is o.
Since our focus is showing how privacy and nondiscrimination are related,
rather prove this result for just an epistemic notion of probability, we provide a
generic proof working for frequentist or Bayesian probabilities.
To do so, we generalize auxiliary information to be any background condition.
We also introduce the terms closed and open to generalize known and unknown.
Section 8.1.1 provides the generic results while Sections 8.1.2 and 8.1.3 discuss
how to interpret these results for privacy and nondiscrimination.
8.1.1 Generic Results
We start by making the concepts mentioned above precise.
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We again use B for background information, but since we do not use causal
interventions for these results, B is not limited background variables. Let ϕ be
closed for B iff B is consistent and Pr[ϕ | B] is 0 or 1. Since we are working
with discrete probabilities, this is the same as B either proving or disproving ϕ.
If ϕ is closed for B, then ¬ϕ is closed for B.
Let ϕ be open for B iff B is consistent and 0 < Pr[ϕ | B] < 1. If ϕ is open
for B, then ¬ϕ is open for B. If ϕ is open for B, then {ϕ,B} is consistent since
Pr[ϕ | SE] > 0.
For consistent B, ϕ is either open for B or closed for B, but not both.
We say that a system is uninformative if there exists an output o such that
Pr[O=o | SE] = 1. In this case, there is no point to observing its output since
its output was already known from SE. A system might be uninformative
because it is a constant function or because only a single input pair is possible:
Pr[X=x ∧ A=a | SE] = 1 for some x and a. We say the system is informative
is it is not uninformative: for all o, Pr[O=o | SE] < 1.
We say that a system s can trivially close ϕ given SE iff ϕ is open for SE,
but s can produce an output o that shows that either ϕ or ¬ϕ holds. That is, for
some o, ϕ is open for SE but closed for {O=o, SE}. Even without considering
the background information of an adversary, such a system closes ϕ for at least
one output.
Theorem 26. Consider SE = {O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A}. For all conditions ϕ,
one of the following is true: ϕ is closed for SE, s is uninformative, s can
trivially close ϕ given SE, or for all o, ϕ is open for {O 6=o ∨ ϕ, SE} but closed
for {O=o, O 6=o ∨ ϕ, SE}.
This result follows from a series of lemmas, starting with one about open
propositions.
Lemma 27. If ϕ is open for {ψ,B}, then ϕ is open for {ϕ ∨ ψ,B}.
Proof. We must show that, when the above condition holds,
0 < Pr[ϕ | ϕ ∨ ψ,B] < 1 (17)
0 <
Pr[ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ,B] ∗ Pr[ϕ | B]
Pr[ϕ ∨ ψ | B]
< 1 (18)
0 <
1 ∗ Pr[ϕ | B]
Pr[ϕ | B] + Pr[ψ | B]− Pr[ϕ ∧ ψ | B]
< 1 (19)
0 <
Pr[ϕ | B]
Pr[ϕ | B] + Pr[ψ | B]− Pr[ψ | B] ∗ Pr[ϕ | ψ,B]
< 1 (20)
Since ϕ is open for {ψ,B}, 0 < Pr[ϕ | ψ,B] < 1. By Bayes rule,
0 < Pr[ϕ | ψ,B] (21)
0 < Pr[ϕ | B] ∗
Pr[ψ | ϕ,B]
Pr[ψ | B]
(22)
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which implies that 0 < Pr[ϕ | B]. Thus,
0 <
Pr[ϕ | B]
Pr[ϕ | B] + Pr[ψ | B]− Pr[ψ | B] ∗ Pr[ϕ | ψ,B]
(23)
Since 0 < Pr[ϕ | ψ,B] < 1,
Pr[ψ | B] ∗ Pr[ϕ | ψ,B] < Pr[ψ | B] (24)
Thus,
0 < Pr[ψ | B]− Pr[ψ | B] ∗ Pr[ϕ | ψ,B] (25)
Pr[ϕ | B] < Pr[ψ | B]− Pr[ψ | B] ∗ Pr[ϕ | ψ,B] + Pr[ϕ | B] (26)
and
Pr[ϕ | B]
Pr[ϕ | B] + Pr[ψ | B]− Pr[ψ | B] ∗ Pr[ϕ | ψ,B]
< 1 (27)
Together (23) and (27) show that (20) holds. Thus, ϕ is open for {ϕ ∨ ψ,B}.
We next prove a theorem about systems s that cannot trivially close ϕ.
Lemma 28. Consider SE = {O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A}. For all systems s that
are informative, if for all o, ϕ is open for {O=o, SE}, then for all o, ϕ is open
for {O 6=o, SE}.
Proof. We must show that, when the above conditions hold, for all o,
0 < Pr[ϕ | O 6=o, SE] < 1 (28)
0 <
Pr[ϕ ∧ O 6=o | SE]
Pr[O 6=o | SE]
< 1 (29)
0 <
Pr[ϕ ∧
∨
o′∈O s.t. o′ 6=o O=o
′ | SE]
Pr[
∨
o′∈O s.t. o′ 6=o O=o
′ | SE]
< 1 (30)
0 <
∑
o′∈O s.t. o′ 6=o Pr[ϕ ∧ O=o
′ | SE]
∑
o′∈O s.t. o′ 6=o Pr[O=o
′ | SE]
< 1 (31)
Since ϕ is open, for all o, Pr[ϕ | O=o′, SE] < 1. Thus,
∑
o′∈O s.t. o′ 6=o
Pr[ϕ ∧ O=o′ | SE] =
∑
o′∈O s.t. o′ 6=o
Pr[ϕ | O=o′, SE] ∗ Pr[O=o′ | SE]
(32)
<
∑
o′∈O s.t. o′ 6=o
Pr[O=o′ | SE] (33)
which implies that
∑
o′∈O s.t. o′ 6=o Pr[ϕ ∧ O=o
′ | SE]
∑
o′∈O s.t. o′ 6=o Pr[O=o
′ | SE]
< 1 (34)
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Since s is informative, for all outputs o′, Pr[O=o′ | SE] < 1. Thus, there must
exist at least two outputs o1 and o2 such that 0 < Pr[O=oi | SE] for i in {1, 2}.
Since, for all o, ϕ is open for {O=o, SE}, for oi ∈ {o1, o2}, 0 < Pr[ϕ | O=oi, SE].
Since 0 < Pr[ϕ | O=oi, SE] and 0 < Pr[O=oi | SE],
0 < Pr[ϕ | O=oi, SE] ∗ Pr[O=oi | SE] = Pr[ϕ ∧ O=oi | SE] (35)
This implies that
0 <
∑
o′∈O s.t. o′ 6=o
Pr[ϕ ∧ O=o′ | SE] (36)
since at most of one o1 and o2 can be o and for all o′, 0 ≤ Pr[ϕ ∧ O=o′ | SE].
Thus,
0 <
∑
o′∈O s.t. o′ 6=o Pr[ϕ ∧ O=o
′ | SE]
∑
o′∈O s.t. o′ 6=o Pr[O=o
′ | SE]
(37)
The inequalities (34) and (37) together imply that (31) holds. Thus, ϕ is
open for {O 6=o, SE}.
Theorem 26 follows directly from the next lemma.
Lemma 29. Consider SE = {O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A} such that s is informative.
For all conditions ϕ such that ϕ is open for SE and s cannot trivially close
ϕ given SE, for all outputs o, ϕ is open for {O 6=o ∨ ϕ, SE} but closed for
{O=o, O 6=o ∨ ϕ, SE}.
Proof. Since ϕ is open for SE and s cannot trivially close ϕ given SE, ϕ is open
for {O=o′, SE} for all o′ including o. Thus, since s is informative, Lemma 28
applies and ϕ is open for {O 6=o′, SE} for all o′ including o. Since ϕ is open for
{O 6=o, SE}, Lemma 27 applies and ϕ is open for {ϕ ∨ O 6=o, SE}.
On the other hand,
Pr[ϕ | ϕ ∨ O 6=o, O=o, SE] = Pr[ϕ | ϕ, O=o, SE] = 1 (38)
Thus, ϕ is closed for {O=o, O 6=o ∨ ϕ, SE}.
We can instantiate Theorem 26 for either privacy or nondiscrimination, as
we do so below.
8.1.2 Privacy Interpretation
For privacy, Theorem 26 corresponds to saying that there always exist an
adversary who will prevent inferential privacy of the statistical nondisclosure
form.
More precisely, for privacy, let resolved from B mean known to be true or
known to be false from just B. We say that someone learns a proposition ϕ
from an observation if ϕ is unresolved from that entity’s background knowledge
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but is resolved from the entity’s background knowledge with observation added
to it. We say that s can trivially resolve ϕ given SE if ϕ is unresolved for SE
but is for the combination of an output of s and SE.
We can restate Theorem 26 as
Corollary 30. Consider SE = {O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A}. For all propositions ϕ,
one of the following is true: ϕ is resolved from SE, s is uninformative, s can
trivially resolve ϕ given SE, or for all o, ϕ is unresolved for {O 6=o ∨ ϕ, SE} but
resolved for {O=o, O 6=o ∨ ϕ, SE}.
Corollary 30 implies the following:
Corollary 31. Consider SE = {O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A}. For all propositions ϕ,
if ϕ is unresolved from SE and s is informative, then there exists an adversary
that experiences a statistical disclosure for ϕ upon seeing some output of s.
Proof. Recall that a statistical disclosure happens for an adversary with
background knowledge B if Cr[ϕ | O=o,B] 6= Cr[ϕ | B], which will happen
if ϕ goes from unresolved to resolved.
Since ϕ is unresolved from SE and s is informative, by Corollary 30, either
s can trivially resolve ϕ given SE or for all o, ϕ is unresolved for {O 6=o ∨ ϕ, SE}
but resolved for {O=o, O 6=o ∨ ϕ, SE}. In the first case, ϕ goes from unresolved
for SE to resolved for {O=o, SE} for some output o. In the second case, ϕ goes
from unresolved for {O 6=o ∨ ϕ, SE} but to resolved for {O=o, O 6=o ∨ ϕ, SE} for
any output o. Either way, there is a statistical disclosure for some output o.
Thus, it is impossible to have a system that both produces interesting
outputs and always prevents statistical disclosures. Dwork and Naor’s
impossibility result [12], which is even stronger, can be viewed as a justification
for focusing on the weaker property of differential privacy.
8.1.3 Nondiscrimination Interpretation
For discrimination, the generic result corresponds to saying that a lack of group
parity (disparate impact) will always exist for some subpopulation.
In more detail, for nondiscrimination, we say that a population lacks all di-
versity of an attribute ϕ if either everyone in that population has ϕ or everyone
in the population lacks ϕ. Otherwise, we say that the population has some diver-
sity of ϕ. Given a population BP , let its ψ subpopulation be the subpopulation
of BP identified by keeping only those members of BP who have the attribute
ψ. We say that a population loses diversity for ϕ in its ψ subpopulation if the
population has some diversity of ϕ but its ψ subpopulation lacks all diversity
of ϕ. We say that s can trivially remove diversity for ϕ from SE if for some
output o of s, SE loses diversity for ϕ in its O=o subpopulation.
We can restate Theorem 26 as
Corollary 32. Consider SE = {O=s(X, A), X=X, A=A}. For all attributes ϕ,
one of the following is true: ϕ lack all diversity for SE, s is uninformative, s can
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trivially remove diversity for ϕ from SE, or for all outputs o, the {O 6=o ∨ ϕ, SE}
subpopulation of SE loses diversity of ϕ in its O=o subpopulation.
An example will make the consequences of this result more clear. Consider a
system s that decided who to hire with the output o meaning hired and consider
the attribute of being male ϕ. Suppose that the system does not simply hire
or not hire everyone, meaning that it is informative. Further suppose that it
hires some but not all males, meaning it does not trivially remove diversity
for ϕ. Then, there exists some subpopulation of all applicants such that that
subpopulation contains both males and females, but only the males are hired
from it. In particular, the subpopulation of men and non-hired women will go
from having diversity to lacking it when focusing on just the hired ones. The
consequence of this is that while we can demand that the system hires both
males and females, we cannot expect this to hold for all subpopulations.
Given the contrived nature of the subpopulation of men and non-hired
women, this may seem obvious and uninteresting. However, three points are
worth bearing in mind.
First, this result shows that the absence of disparate impact for all
subpopulations cannot be met for interesting systems s. Some bounds on
the subpopulations considered must be placed on demands for group parity,
and future work can search for reasonable bounds instead of trying to provide
mechanisms providing universal nondiscrimination. This is similar in spirit to
Dwork and Naor’s result in that the adversary was not particularly realistic
there either, but the result still forced researchers to give up the search for
mechanisms ensuring statistical nondisclosure in all cases.
Second, if any non-empty subpopulation of the {O 6=o ∨ ϕ, SE} subpopulation
can be identified using some other attribute χ, then it may seem that the
attribute χ is causing some form of intersectional discrimination against those
identified by ϕ∧χ for attribute ψ of getting hired (O=o). For example, suppose
that all the applicants who are black falls into the set of men and non-hired
women, that is, no black women were hired. It is possible that some form
of intersectional discrimination is at play, that is, discrimination not against
women per se, nor black people per se, but rather against black women.
It is also possible that outcome came about by noise. The possibility of
noise looks more likely as the third attribute χ gets more contrived looking. For
example, if instead of it being a simple racial attribute, consider χ identifying
applicants who are from Spain and over the age of 40. Is there intersectional
discrimination against older Spanish women? Or is it just a fluke?
While we do not do so here, we conjecture that modeling the input space A
more explicitly as a rich and diverse set of attributes would allow us to show
that one can always identify some such χ that is simple.
Third, returning to the goal of this paper, our real aim was to show that one
can produce general results that apply to both privacy and nondiscrimination
and then specialize them for each. Corollaries 30 and 32 meets this goal.
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8.2 Probabilistic Program Analysis
There exists a significant body of work in the formal security literature
on achieving formal bounds on probabilistic properties, aimed at verifying
probabilistic security properties of programs. Techniques used to estimate
the probability of outcomes include abstract interpretation [63], volume
computation [64], and sampling [65]. While this body of work has largely focused
on security properties, as the properties are equivalent at a mathematical level,
techniques for the analysis of probabilistic programs can be directly used for
fairness properties.
In one example, Albarghouti et al. [66] use a volume computation technique
to either verify that the program satisfies a probabilistic fairness property or
provides a counterexample that demonstrates the program is biased. They
focus on disparate impact as a notion of discrimination:
Pr[O=o | X=x1] ≤ k ∗ Pr[O=o | X=x2]
Their approach requires the specification of two programs: popModel and
dec. The program dec is the program that decides the outcomes O for
individuals, and popModel generates random individuals from a population
which are fed to dec. The problem of estimating disparate impact, then reduces
to estimating the quantities Pr[O=o∧X=xi] and Pr[X=xi] for i ∈ {1, 2}. All of
these quantities can be estimated from the outcome of the composed program
dec ◦ popModel using methods from security.
As another example of the connection between privacy and
nondiscrimination, we note that probabilistic coupling forms the core of
approaches to ensuring both. On the one hand, a line of work has used
probabilistic couplings to verify that an algorithm provides differential
privacy [67–70]. On the other hand, Friedler et al. have presented a series of
probabilistic notions of (un)fairness [71]. Their definitions structural bias (their
Def. 3.5), direct discrimination (their Def. 3.6), and nondiscrimination (their
Def. 3.7) each have couplings (their Def. 2.5) at their cores.
8.3 Statistical Scrubbing of Inputs
A separate body of work [72–75] addresses inference attacks in data sets by
mapping each row D to a row D′ such that Y is independent to sensitive
attributes with respect to some fixed background knowledge B. The key idea
is that if the inputs D are independent to sensitive attributes X , D′⊥X | B,
then for any function f , f(D′)⊥X | B. We term such mappings from D to D′
statistical scrubbing.
Independently, a body of work [47, 48] in the machine learning literature
attempts to solve the same problem of statistical scrubbing in a data set to
achieve independence with respect to sensitive attributes for providing group
parity.
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8.4 Generalized Distance Metrics for Differential Privacy
One idea that appears in both nondiscrimination and privacy literature is the
generalization of differential privacy from indistinguishability over neighboring
databases to indistinguishability over nearby inputs as measured by some
distance metric. In [18], Dwork et al. propose a notion of fairness that
states that similar people should be treated similarly. Formally the definition
requires that the distance in distribution over outputs be bounded by the
distance between output, a classical Lipschitz continuity requirement. In [76],
Chatzikokolakis et al. propose a similar generalization for different privacy
notions that and apply the definition in the contexts of smart meter privacy
and geo-location privacy.
9 Discussion
We have explored the relationship between privacy and nondiscrimination
at a mathematical level. We have shown that both use privacy and
nondiscrimination definitions come in associative and causal flavors. We have
shown, at a mathematical level, that the basic form of the two associative
definitions are identical and that the basic form of the two causal definitions
are identical. This similarity has allowed us to show what the relationships
are between both associative definitions and both causal definitions at once.
It has also allowed us to re-use a proof about privacy to say something about
nondiscrimination. We believe this work shows that, to avoid duplication of
effort, computer science research on privacy and nondiscrimination should not
be siloed into separate communities.
This is not to say that privacy and nondiscrimination are or should be
collapsed into one problem. The definitions, despite having the same formal
structures, differ in their interpretations and what the variables model. Neither
can do the job of the other; attention must be paid to both.
Furthermore, privacy and nondiscrimination can interact both positively
and negatively. For example, not disclosing one’s race on an employment
application may help prevent discrimination in some settings. Furthermore,
nondiscrimination can lessen some privacy concerns. For example, banning
health insurers from discriminating based on pre-existing conditions may lessen
the degree of privacy patients with expensive conditions seek. On the other
hand, privacy can hide discrimination. Our work may be a starting point for
exploring these interactions.
Lastly, in all cases, the mathematical characterizations we use are
simplifications of the the social norms and laws they characterize. For one,
both privacy and nondiscrimination norms contain exceptions. An example
for privacy is that patient–physician confidentiality may be set aside by court
orders. As for nondiscrimination, disparate impact is allowed where a “business
necessity” exists. Furthermore, nondiscrimination law contains many features
that we do not capture, such as intent. In particular, we replaced the vague
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concept of intent with the more precise concept of cause. Exploring what
intent might look like for automated systems could provide more nuanced
models of disparate treatment. Nevertheless, we believe our mathematical
characterizations capture the essence of what each norm or law is attempting
to achieve.
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A Example System
Here we present an example system showing that ϕ could be closed for
{O 6=o ∨ ϕ, SE} despite not being closed for SE. This motivates the condition
that the system s cannot trivially close ϕ given SE in Lemma 29. In particular,
note that example below does trivially close ϕ given SE when the output is
nonpositive.
As before, let SE be O=s(X, A), X=X , and A=A, and let it hold. Consider the
program s(x, a) = pos(x, a) which returns whether x is positive, with positive
meaning yes it is and nonpositive meaning no it is not. Since pos ignores its
second input, we will drop it. Suppose that the range X of X is {0, 1, 2}.
Consider the sensitive condition ϕ that is whetherX is even, that is, even(X).
Seeing the output O only sometimes reveals whether even(X) holds. If the output
is pos(X) = nonpositive, then the input must have been 0, and even(X) must
hold. If the output is pos(X) = positive, then the input could have been 1 or
2, and even(X) may or may not hold. The following diagram summarizes this
state of affairs:
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even(X) X X = X O = pos(X)
0 0
true nonpositive
1 1
false positive
2 2
To understand how this relates to Lemma 29, let us focus on when the output
O takes on the value o = positive. Note that ϕ is open for {O=positive, SE}.
Consider the background context O 6=positive ∨ even(X), that is, that
O=positive implies even(X). Given this context, seeing the output positive would
imply even(X). Thus, given this context, one can learn the sensitive condition
for either output of s.
However, one would not even need to see the output to learn the sensitive
condition given this context. Consider an analysis by cases. If O 6=positive holds,
then X must be 0 and even(X) holds. If even(X) holds, then even(X) must
hold. So, either way even(X) must hold.
The issue is that O not having the value positive implied too much: it implies
that the output must be nonpositive, which implies ϕ holds. The following table,
which shows the values of X that lead to each value for ϕ and O, illustrates this
issue:
even(X)
pos(X) true false
nonpositive 0
positive 2 1
Note that no value is both odd and nonpositive, meaning that s trivially closes
ϕ for the nonpositive output. This means that set of value of X that makes
O 6=positive ∨ ϕ true, which is equivalent to O=nonpositive ∨ ϕ, only has a value
of X for when ϕ is true. Thus, it implies the truth of ϕ without needing to see
the value of O.
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